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I1 11 HI! ". M llll PROCEEDINGS
1.

Alpha Security Trust, a named petitioner which is the entity which holds . ~
subject property, in trust, for the benefit of Mr. Eugene B. Lynch's children

2.

Eugene B. Lynch, founder and sole contributor (along with his wife) trustee of Alpha
Security Trust. Mr. Lynch is representing his trust, Alpha Security Trust in these
proceedings. Mr. Lynch is 80 years old and was ill at the hearing of July 7,1995.

3.

Harold Perkins, a named petitioner and owner of certain of the subject property. Mr.
Perkins is representing himself. Mr. Perkins is also a retired senior citizen.

4.

Board of equalization or Kich County, State of Utah, the entity which originally denied
petitioners' request for reduction of the assessed value of the subject property,
resulting in petitionee '-'ina a Petition for Redetermination with the Utah State Tax
Commission.

5.

The Utah State T ax commission, the agency which ei ttered the Findings of Fad,
Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision which is the subject of the Petition for Re\ riew.

6.

In addition to Mr. Lynch and Mr. Perkins, Mr. Marvin iiuiauf appeared as the spokes
person for Mr. Lynch and Mi I erkins at the request for adjustment before the board
of Equalization, at the arbitration/pre trial hearing and the formal hearing in this matter
on July 7, 1995 Mi Zulauf is Gene Lynch's son-in law, a property owner in Rich
County, and a friend of Mr. Perkins. Mr Zulauf s qualifications were submitted to the
Respondent with answers to Respondent's interrogatories. In summary Mr. Zulauf s
qualifications are that he has been a real estate appraiser actively engaged in complex
real estate assignments since 1971, a real estate tax consultant since 1976, an
instructor of real estate appraisal at Cypress College, owner of a general contracting
and real estate development company. Mr. Zulauf holds a limited (limited to all areas
of real estate) lifetime, teaching credential for community colleges in the state of
California. Mr. Lynch was ill the day of the trial and Mr. Zulauf was acting as his
spokes person. Mr. Zulauf presented information collected by Mr. Lynch before the
hearing. Most of the information presented by Mr. Zulauf applied to both petitioners
due to the similarities of the cases. The Tax Commission did not give Perkins time to
present all of the individual difference relative to this property vs. the Lynch property.

JURISDICTION
This case was originally filed by petitioners in the Utah Supreme Court and was later
assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. SS63046b-16 and 78-2-2(4).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Regarding page 1 paragraph 2 of the Respondents Brief the petitioners were deprived
of due process in at least 8 instances in the instant case.
Regarding page 1 paragraph 3 of Respondents Brief the petitioners told the Tax
Commission of July 7 1995 that the Respondents were required by Federal Statues to verify
their sales in developing their report. Petitioners were surprised to find at the hearing of July
7,1995 that although respondents had over a year to properly verify their sales before trial,
they had failed to meet minimum federal statutes regarding sale verification. The petitioners
had verified all sales presented at the hearing, the respondents as well as the petitioners.
The petitioners relied on the respondents own sales. The petitioners were cross-examined
regarding their verification of the respondents sales. The petitioners were not given the
opportunity to cross examine the respondents regarding their verification of the sale because
the respondents did not adequately verily their sales with a interview with any of the principles
of the transaction. In a post hearing memorandum- the pivotal evidence for the Tax
Commission- the Tax Commission did not allow any cross-examination or rebuttal of the "new
evidence" presented by the respondents.
Regarding page 3 paragraph 1 of Respondents Brief, the petitioners were unable to
cross examine the respondents regarding their verification of the personal property included
in each sale because the respondents failed to verify their sales with a principle of the
transaction(s). The respondents counsel appears to be confused as to the types of
verifications called for by USPAP and generally accepted appraisal techniques. SR6 deals
with mass appraisal and requires less strenuous verifications than SR1 and SR2 which
concern individual appraisals like the Bischoff/Pia and Ferrel appraisals. SR6 requires testing
l

of a sample after values are established because of the more relaxed verification
requirements. Generally, SR6 verification can be accomplished by a questionnaire filled out
by the buyer/seller, a survey if you will. To make up for the relaxed verifications under SR6
testing of the mass appraisal model is required to insure accuracy. Accuracy is determined
by industry standards. With individual appraisals more detailed verification is required
because there is no follow up testing. Respondents counsel is either unfamiliar with general
accepted appraisal practices and Federal Statutes or is purposely trying to mislead the Court.
The truth of the matter is that the Rich County Board of Equalization, Assessor, etc.
have incorporated adjustments for market conditions at the time of sale, personal property,
and lowered the petitioners land values when values have been increasing, for the tax year
1996. This fact, more than anything else indicates why respondents tried to win in law in
motion what they cannot possible hope to gain under appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners objects to the statement of the case presented for review as set forth by the
respondents to the extent that it misrepresents the facts of the case and misleads the court
procedural posture of the case at the time of the formal hearing and events leading up to and
subsequent to the hearing.

Respondent's Counsel left out the dates relative to the tour in

law in motion given to the Petitioners whereby Respondent's Counsel tried unsuccessfully
to win in law in motion what they cannot possible hope to win in the appeal process.
Regarding the respondents statement of the case beginning on page 4 of the respondents
brief, the petitioners offer the following:
1 thru 4
5.

No Objections.

The Lynch and Perkins appeals were consolidated over the objection of Rich County
by Chairman W. Val Oveson.

6.

A settlement conference was held on May 2, 1995, in Randolph, Utah, which was
converted to a Pre-hearing Conference because the petitioners had a preponderance
of evidence indicating their land value was closer to $400 per front than their
2

assessments of $700 per front foot.
7 thru 10.
11.

No Objections.

On July 05,1995, Plaintiff Lynch received, 2 business days before trial, respondent's
responses to the interrogatories of petitioner Lynch, with documents on the position
the respondent intended to take at the hearing.

12.

On July 05,1995, Plaintiff Perkins received, 2 business days before trial, respondent's
responses to the interrrogatories of petitioner Perkins, with documents on the position
the respondent intended to take at the hearing.

13.

Petitioners had not been in possession of the Bischoff Appraisal for 10 months, as
alluded to by Respondent's Counsel. Petitioner Lynch obtained a copy of the Bischoff
Appraisal at the end of the Board of Equalization hearing. The appraisal presented at
the Board of Equalization hearing, was not signed by the lead appraiser Pia and
therefore was tantamount to no appraisal at all. On June 2,1994 Respondent provided
a signed copy of the Bischoff/Pia appraisal.

14.

The fact that the respondents had not properly verified their own sales, the sales they
used in their reports, was not known until the hearing began. Tr.7. Respondent's
Counsel's allegation that the petitioners' are some how suppose to know the
Respondents appraisers did not verify their sales, when they stated in their appraisals
they did, is not only preposterous bu^goes beyond the broadest construction of
reasonableness. Petitioner has no obligation to assume the Respondents are not
going to comply with minimum federal statutes.

15.

Respondent's counsels' allegation that Petitioner's raised no objection at the hearing
relative to the Commissioners ruling regarding the post-hearing submission is untrue
and misleading. The Tax Commission did not follow its own order. Tr 139 indicated
the Tax Commission would not let either party enter any new information, and
Petitioners did not. Nearly, all of the Respondents post hearing memorandum was
new information. Bias information that was never cross examined.

16.

April of 1996 Respondents Counsel files an unsuccessful motion to dismiss Lynchs'
3

appeal because Lynch was not represented by an attorney.
17.

April of 1996 Respondents1 Counsel files an unsuccessful motion to have portions of
the Petitioners' opening brief stricken.
Regarding page 3 Footnote 4 of Respondent's Brief, again Respondent's counsel must

not have read the Tr. Petitioner Lynch never spoke on pages 70-75; Petitioner Lynch was ill
the day of the hearing and made few, if any, comments at the hearing. Mr. Perkins spoke
under cross examination but was never given an opportunity to present his case Tr 40 line
20-23.
Regarding page 9 footnote 11 the beginning of Respondent's brief*lt is apparent from a review of the transcript that additional time allowed by the
Commission's was necessitated by petitioners' failure to respond to discovery
request rather than the Commission's desire to thwart petitioners. Recognizing
that petitioners were not represented by counsel and may have been unfamiliar
with the formalities of the appeal process, the Commission clearly acted to
accommodate petitioners, not respondent, by allowing the post-hearing
submissions."
Respondents' Counsel must be trying to make a joke, this statement is the way they wish it
was. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The purpose of the post hearing submission was
to allow Respondent's appraisers time to verify their sales (the sales they used in their
appraisal reports) with a principle of the transaction. Tr. 106-113. Respondent's counsel
again must not have read the Tax Commission Decision and Findings of Fact. The post
hearing submission was for the sole benefit of the Respondents. Petitioner's had no way of
knowing Respondents appraisers had not complied with USPAP and adequately verified their
sales before the appraisals were completed. Respondents counsel somehow insinuates
Petitioner's had a duty to present Respondents case for them. Petitioner's have no control
over the law or the policies of the Rich County's appraisal policies. It is the duty of the Tax
Commission and this Court to see that the Respondent complies with the law. Additionally,
Petitioner's did not fail to comply with discovery - Respondents failed to comply with
4

discovery. Petitioner's submitted the information on June 23,1995, 7 days before the due
date. Respondents on the other hand mailed their response some time after June 29,1995,
8+ days before trail. Petitioners received respondents response on July 5, 1995, two days
before the hearing. Respondent purposely submitted the response untimely, so Petitioner's
would not have time to discover, their failure to comply with state and federal statutes.
Furthermore, at the settlement conference was held on May 2, 1995, in Randolph,
Utah, which was converted to a Pre-hearing Conference because the petitioners had a
preponderance of evidence indicating their land value was closer to $400 per front than their
assessments of $700 per front foot. The petitioners claimed that the Rich County Assessor
did not have one single land sale to support their $700 per front foot value. Because there
are none. The time frame established by the Rich County Board of Equalization [item 4 of the
petition for re adjustment] clearly states that sales must be used that have occurred not more
than 12 months before the date of assessment, January 1,1994, or 6 months after the date
of assessment. This means sale between January 1,1993 and June 30, 1994 could be used
to support value conclusions. Because, and only because, the state did not have and sales
to support their $700 front foot value with in the allowable sales period established by the
Board of Equalization, Chairman W. Val Oveson unilaterally extended the sales period to
include any sale the Rich County Assessor wanted to use. The reason for the 18 month sales
period which had been used by the Board of Equalization for 15 years was that the Board of
Equalization commonly ignored time adjustments. If sales occur within a reasonable time
relative to the date of assessment then time adjustments generally do not affect values.
However, the purpose of this decision enabled the Respondents to incorporate what they
thought was a good sale to support their land value of $700 per front foot. The Jensen lot,
4 lots west of the Lynch property, sold for $700 per front foot in September or October of
1994. Under cross examination the States expert witness conceded that the Jensen sale was
far superior to the Lynch property. The Jensen sale took place 9 to 10 months after the date
of assessment requiring a negative 10% adjustment, was narrower than the Lynch property
requiring a negative 10% adjustment, was improved with a fence and concrete bulk head
5

another 10% negative adjustment, and was elevated above the high water mark another 10%
negative adjustment. The adjusted value of the Jensen sale was approximately $700 per
front foot minus 40%($280) equals $420 per front foot. The Tax Commission raised the bar
for the petitioners. No other tax payer, no other property owner, save the two petitioners,
had to defend their values over an extended time period. Petitioners are at a loss and
frankly confused. How does depriving a citizen of due process "accommodate petitioners".

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR REDUCTION OF THEIR PROPERTY
ASSESSMENTS BASED ON ALLEGED DEFECTS IN THE ASSESSMENT
ROLL, WAS SUPPORTED BY PETITIONERS AND UNCONTRADICTED THE
RESPONDENTS
The last paragraph of page 15 of the Respondents Brief indicates that Exhibit 1
prepared by the Petitioners was untimely. This argument is misleading and meritless. The
petition of adjustment, alleges the assessors tax roll is fatally defective. The notice of appeal,
alleges the assessors tax roll is fatally defective, the interrogatories question the methods of
testing the accuracy of the assessed valuations of Rich County. And finally, the first 15 to
20 minutes of the Petitioner's's presentation at trial concerned the fatally defective tax roll of
the Rich County Assessor Tr 10-22.. Apparently Respondent's counsel has not review the
Court Record or the transcript of the proceedings.
Regarding footnote 16 at the bottom of page 12, there was no exclusion of information
in light of the whole record. What is puzzling, is that respondent is now, for the first time
questioning the exhibit. Respondent's counsel has not cited one single objection to the exhibit
raised at the hearing of July 7,1995. BECAUSE THERE ARE NONE. Respondent's counsel
should read the transcript and the Bischoff/Pia appraisal report. Additionally, all of the sales
were obtained from Pete Mower, the Rich County Assessor. Respondent's counsel is trying
to retry the case. The Bischoff/Pia report/Farrell report contain all of the sales presented on
Exhibit 1. Petitioners assume that since Pete Mower, Rich County Assessor, verified the sales
information with the Petitioners that he was familiar with the sales.
6

Page 10 and 11 of the Respondent's Brief argues that Exhibit 1, is a random sample
and does not contain information regarding the terms of the sales, arms length transactions,
personal property, etc. Again Respondent's counsel must not of read the court transcript.
Tr. P12-17 goes over each sale in Exhibit I as well as numerous other errors in the
assessment roll. TR.16 indicates the sample size is 400 homes/parcels around the lake. The
information was obtained from Pete Mower, the Rich County Assessor. Pete Mower was
present at the hearing of July 7,1995. I am sure if there wereiany questions relative to arms
length transactions, personal property, terms of sale, etc. petitioners would have been crossed
examined. Furthermore, all of the sales were presented in the Bischoff/ Pia/ Farrell Appraisal
reports and were familiar to the Respondent.
Page 12,13, and 14 of Respondent's Brief indicates the Commissioner is questioning
the Petitioners and not the Respondents. The Commissioner provided some insight in to the
fact that the Tax Commission did not understand the simple fact that taxation cannot be fair
and equal unless assessed values are accurate to within industry standards. The primary
responsibility of the assessor is uniform accurate assessed values. Assessed values where
the tax rate distributes the tax burden fairly among the property owners. The case Utah Power
& Light v. Utah State Tax Com'n., P2d 332 (Utah 1979), supports the Petitioner's position
that the Tax Commissions' decision can and should be upset when it is appears so unfair and
unreasonable, that it must be regarded as arbitrary.

The Petitioner's exhibit 1 was

uncontradicted at the hearing because it was and is accurate. If there is something wrong
with Exhibit 1 What is it? Respondent's counsel did not provide one single accurate fact
contradicting the facts of Exhibit 1. Because there are none. The facts are that only 13%
of the lake front property values at Bear Lake are with in industry standards, 87% are not
within industry standards. In deed, if 87% error does not constitute substantial error what
does?
I think the Tax Commission was confused 13% accuracy vs. 87% inaccuracy, it should clearly
be the reverse, and the decision reversed. Article XIII, section 2 (1) of the Utah Constitution
states in pertinent part:
7

All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United States, or under this
Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value, to be
ascertained as provided by law.
Section 3 of the same article provides in part:
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment on all tangible
property in the state according to its value in money...The Legislature shall prescribe by law such
provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such property, so that every person and
corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property.
With 87% inaccuracy how do we know if any of the tax is proportional to the value. [ We did
not know in 1994 but we do in 1996; the County has reappraised the lake front properties at
Bear Lake, and guess What?- Many of the lake front property values are being lowered
significantly, including the petitioners'; while many others are being increased significantlywhy? Because the 1994 assessment roll relative to lake front properties was and is
fatally defective.]
Regarding page 3 paragraph 2 of Respondent's Brief, the respondent's counsel is
trying to mislead the court into thinking that not cross-examination of the respondent case is
at issue. The truth is that not being to able to cross-examine the new information submitted
by the respondents expert appraisers is only one of the issues that deprived petitioners of due
process. A summary of the issues where the petitioners were deprived of due process follows
in chronological order:
1.

At the settlement conference of may 2, 1994, Commissioner Val W. Oveson
raised the bar for Petitioners. Petitioners were required to include sales over
a significantly wider time frame than the typical taxpayer. The burden of proof
was clearly higher for the petitioners than any other tax payer.

2.

At the hearing of July 7, 1995 Commissioner Val W. Oveson allowed the
respondents expert witness to participate in the entire proceedings and would
not exclude them from the court room, except for testimony. Tr 9

3.

At the hearing of July 7, 1995, commissioner Oveson let the respondent's
witness and others present at the hearing, join in a group discussion when
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answering Petitioner's questions. All references to speaker in the transcript
indicate the court transcriber could not tell who was talking. Group discussions
before answering a question asked of a specific witness also raises the bar and
makes it more difficult for the petitioner's to prevail.
4.

At the hearing of July 7,1995, the respondent's expert witness were allowed
to question the petitioners. Tr 123-124.

5.

Commission Oveson verbally attacked the petitioners spokes person Tr 128132. The commissioner encouraged the respondents to use valuable court
time concerning none issues, such as the petitioners being required to be
licensed to represent themselves at the hearing Tr 79-80, Tr 128-132. Time that
could have been used to let Petitioner Perkins present his case Tr 40.

6.

The tax commissioner allowed respondents to proceed when the respondent's
response to petitioner's interrogatories were non-responsive Tr 8, and untimely
Tr106, 139

7.

The tax commission gave respondents an additional 10 days to verify their
comparable sales information. Information that according to 1993 USPAP SR
1-4(b) should have been preformed while developing their appraisal and prior
to July 14, 1994 for Bischoff/Pia and April 20,1995! for the Farrell appraisal,
the effective date of the appraisal(s).
POINT II.

PETITIONERS' ALLEGATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES IN THE RESPONDENTS
APPRAISAL EVIDENCE IS SUPPORTED RESPONDENTS EXPERT WITNESS POST
HEARING MEMORANDUM AND THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDING
A. Respondents' counsel was not present at the hearing of July 7, 1995 so we are
assuming they are unfamiliar with the law and the proceedings of that hearing and not
purposely trying to mislead and deceive the Court. At the Board of Equalization hearing, for
the petition for adjustment, the members of the Board of Equalization stated they never herd
of the Uniform of Standards of Appraisal Practice. Our comment was and is how could
9

they(the Board of Equalization) over see the appraisal process when they are not familiar with
the Federal Statutes that govern the development and preparations of appraisal reports.
Please note footnote 19, Respondents' counsel could not tell who answered because
their client was busy violating the petitioners constitutional right to due process. The Tax
Commission not only denied petitioners motion to have the expert witness excluded from the
hearing but let the expert witness, and others present at the hearing (the audience if you
will) join in a group discussion to answer the petitioners questions.
Respondents allegation is contradicted by the Pia/Bischoff post hearing memorandum.
The last paragraph of page 3, of the Pia Letter (Opening Brief- A8) states in pertinent part
"perhaps overlooked in the previous work, is the contributory value of personal property in
some of the sales". So to clarify the facts the Board of Equalization was not aware of USPAP,
their expert witness were aware of but did not follow USPAP. This is further substantiated by
TR 72 bottom of page and top of 73- the speaker (again after a group discussion) "we did, but
not- not as specifically as you did"... referring to the fact that there broker survey was not as
detailed as the Petitioner's'. Not as specific means they did not do one at all, and they did not
talk to a principle of the transaction before trial. Respondents' counsel has not cited one
single instance in the transcript of the proceedings where the Respondents; expert witness
talked to a principle of any of their comparable sales. Because there are none.
B.

The comparable sales utilized by respondents experts were not verified by

the appraisers preparing the reports at the time the appraisals were prepared.
The central theme running through page 18 and 19 of the Respondents Brief is that the
appraisers verified their sales at the time the appraisals were prepared. This is misleading
and untrue and probably another violation of 1993 USPAP. SR1-3(b) requires the appraisers
to collect, verify and analyze their sales in developing a real property appraisal. The reason
in collecting and verifying data while developing the appraisal is so all pertinent data will be
analyzed in the final value estimate. Not a face saving, client saving effort after the appraisal
is submitted and testified to in court. The language used by Respondent's counsel on sales
1, 3, 4, and 6 "Verified through Rich County Records and Buyer - Survey means the
10

appraisers never talked to any of the principles of theses transactions in preparing their
appraisals. They obtained their comparables from the Rich County Assessor and the Real
Property Transfer Survey, submitted to the assessor, by the buyer.

These forms are

acceptable for mass appraisals, 1993-1995 USPAP SR6, but inadequate and unacceptable
for individual appraisals governed by SR1 and SR2, because no appraisal model testing is
required to hone in on an accurate value. The Buyer-Survey (Real Property Transfer Survey)
form submitted to the Rich County Assessor does not include,* among other significant items,
adequate information regarding personal property included in the sales price, arms length
transactions, or market conditions at the time of sale.

Had Respondent verified their

transactions with at least one principle of the transaction then, assuming they asked the right
questions, they would have been able to ascertain if the transactions were arms length, Tr
110-112, contained personal property, etc. USPAP 1995 SR2-(a)(vi) requires the appraisers
to state the extent of the process of collecting, confirming, and reporting data. Additionally,
SR 2-3 requires the
appraisers to disclose that their compensation is not contingent upon the reporting of
a predetermined value of direction in value that favors the cause of the client, the amount
of value estimated, the attainment of a stipulated result, of the occurrence of a
subsequent event.; and, disclose that
no one provided significant professional assistance to the person signing the report. (If
there are exceptions, the name of each individual providing significant professional
assistance must be stated.)
When the assessor verifies the appraisers' sales, provides the appraisers' with only the
sales they want the appraiser to use and the appraisers don't independently verify the sales,
then the client is leading the appraiser in a direction of value. Sales 2 and 5 were obtained
from the Rich County Assessor. The transcript of the proceedings Tr 107-110, and the Pia
post Hearing memorandum, speak for themselves. Respondent's expert appraisers had the
opportunity to verify the sales but choose not to verify arms length transaction, personal
property, market conditions at the time of sale, etc. How independent can a valuation be if
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the appraiser relies on only the comparable sales furnished and verified by their client?
Maybe the assessor should have signed their report. Had the expert appraisers fessed up
to the fact that they relied on their clients verification, the new information, surprise, ruse
would not of been necessary-neither would this appeal. The Tax Commission would have had
to make a decision based on the information submitted at trial. Contrary to the smoke and
mirrors presented by Respondent's counsel, the Petitioners; complied with USPAP, the
Respondents did not. The same is true for the Farrell appraisal on Perkins property. The
appraisers never talked to any of the principles of the transactions, until after the hearing of
July, 7, 1995 (save one Bill Peterson and we don't know that he was the listing or selling
agent on sale 2 & 5).
The respondents expert appraisers did not know about non arms length transactions,
personal property etc. because they relied on the Rich County's inadequate verification - Not
their own work product.
POINT III.
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING OF FACT AND THE FINAL DECISION
ARE CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND NOT SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Page 20 paragraph 2, is yet another misleading and meritless accusation. Again,
Respondent's counsel must not have read the final decision of the Tax Commission and wants
this Court to retry the case. Page of the Tax Commissions Finding of Facts Conclusions of
Law and Final Decision clearly states on page 5 paragraph 1
The assertions of Petitioners that Respondent failed to properly verify the comparable
sales could have been determinative in favor of the petitioners had respondent not
presented evidence that the assertion laked merit."

The point is that the preponderance of the evidence shows the Respondents did not properly
verify their sales and the petitioners assertions did not lack merit.

Additionally, the

respondent's expert witness testified the petitioner's verifications were more detailed. Tr 73.
The petitioners presented the "best evidence" and prevailed at trial so the bar was raised yet
again. The Commission kept rasing the bar until the petitioners went home. After the

12

petitioners went home and could not cross examine the post hearing memorandum, the
Commission, in spite of the preponderance of evidence presented by petitioners at trial, found
in favor of the Respondent. If the Tax Commission can extend the hearing by 10 days why
not by two years. In 1996 the Rich County Assessor, based on a reappraisal of lake front
properties at Bear Lake, significantly lowered the Petitioners values, they indirectly
acquiesced to Petitioners 1994 values.
The Court is requested to ignore pages 21 paragraph 1 thru page 41 paragraph 2 as
an attempt to mislead the Court, introduce new information and retry the instant case. The
fact of the matter is that the 1996 reappraisal of Bear Lake, lake front, properties has
significantly lowered the Petitioners property values and incorporated the issues presented
by the Petitioners'. Specifically, during a period when values have been increasing, according
to Bear Lake Realtors and the Respondents expert appraisers, the Rich County Assessor has
significantly lowered the petitioners' land value for the 1996 tax year, incorporated
adjustments for personal property, and market conditions at the time of sale, and are
disregarding non-arms length transactions. All of which were violations of USPAP in 1994.
According to local Realtors, prices are up approximately 20 % since 1994. Additionally, there
are fewer listings available and not enough properties available to satisfy demand. Given
increasing values over the last two years you would expect the petitioners' land values to have
increased from $700 a front foot to say( $700 times 1.20 or) $840 per front foot. But guess
what? The petitioners land values for 1996 are $575 and $650 per front foot respectfully for
Perkins and Lynch. Based on the Rich Counties own information, we can back into the 1994
land value with a little simple math. Perkins land value would be $575 times .80% (adjusted
for two years of price increases) or $460 per front foot, not to far from the petitioners estimated
$400 - $450 per front foot. Using the same analysis, Lynches land value for 1994 would have
been $650 times 80% or $520 per front foot in 1994. The Court will be happy to know we
have appealed these two lower assessments. Even though Rich County has started cleaning
up their act, they still have a long way to go to be in compliance with USPAP and generally
accepted appraisal practices.
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A. Even though the 1996 reassessment basically proves the petitioners' case and we
are entitles to 25 pages in our reply brief.

So, Petitioners will briefly address the

Respondent's counsel's allegations.
In response to page 21 Paragraph 1, petitioners submit the following. It is common
knowledge that most lake front properties at Bear Lake sell with personal property. The
logical reason for this, is that most of the lake front properties are second homes and the
sellers do not have any place to put the furnishings, fixtures and equipment. The typical seller
is a retired person that can no longer take care of the property and does not need tractors,
trailers, boats, wave runners etc. The value of the comparable, generally the sales price, is
an indication of the value of the personal property associated with the sale. By this petitioners
mean a $60,000 sales price would typically have less personal property than a $160,000 sales
price. The typical value of personal property included in the sales price for Bear Lake, lake
front property, is between 5 to 15% of the sales price.
Regarding page 21 of Respondents Brief, Respondent's counsel has cleverly (or not
so cleverly) worded this ruse to deceive the court into believing Respondent's experts verified
the sale before July 7,1995. Note the hearing was heard on July 7,1995 but Respondent's
inquiry was.."...We spoke with Mr. Mc Lean on Monday, July 10,1995...." What is appalling
and a violation of the Petitioners constitutional rights (14th Amendment) is that the Tax
Commission relied on this verification. A verification one year after the appraisal report was
submitted (July 14,1994) and 16 months after the sale took place. A verification that did not
disclose the fact that a debt (personal property) was off set for his part of the property, a
verification that did not account for all of the lot area that existed before and after the transfers
and a transaction that should have and would not have been used as a comparable sale if the
Respondent's expert would have verified the sale while developing the appraisal. SR 1-4(b).
The top of page 23 paragraph 1 of Respondents Brief, indicates that Respondent's
counsel did not read, Tr 35 and 36. Tr 36-36 explains an $10,000 adjustment and considered
personal property, forgiveness of debt. In case respondent's counsel is confused-forgiveness
of debt is considered personal property. Again, the sale would not even have been used if the
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Respondent's expert appraisers had verified the sale with a principle of the transaction in
developing their report. The point in discussing this was to indicate to the Tax Commission
that Respondent had not complied with minimum Federal Standards and had relied upon their
client, Rich County Assessor, for their sales. An action that would render the independence
of their experts valuation suspect. Additionally, had Petitioner's had the opportunity to crossexamine the Respondent's verification of July 10, 1995 Petitioner's could have discerned
what happened tot he other !4 of the lot not accounted for by the Respondent's expert
appraiser, how much the forgivers of the debt could effect value, what adjustment was made
or should have been made for the relationship of buyer/seller. All significant questions
Petitioner's did not have the opportunity to have answered. Not because Petitioner's was not
prepared at the hearing but because Respondent was not prepared at the hearing. The
Petitioner's, two elderly senior citizens prevailed at the hearing. The entire resources of Rich
County and the State were not prepared and so the Tax Commission raised the bar yet again,
and gave respondent 10 days to verify the sales they used in their reports. NOT THE
PETITIONERS COMPARABLE SALES BUT THE RESPONDENTS COMPARABLE SALES.
Petitioner's reverification did not restate the facts presented at the hearing it stated the facts
the commissioner did not allow at the hearing due to time constraints.
Regarding page 23 paragraph 1, it appears Respondent's counsel is unable to
distinguishes between real and personal property. Forgiveness or off setting a debt involves
personal property. The debt offset was certainly not real property. The furniture, fixtures and
equipment included in the transaction was presented and discussed at trail. Tr 35. The fact
that the sale was not arms length as well as other non arms length transactions were also
discussed at the hearing Tr. Line 19 page 19, page 22, 24, 36, 108, 110. Please note
Respondent's Board of Equalization and Pia post hearing memorandum did not discussed
Sale 2 of the Respondent's experts appraisal was not verified by a principle of the transaction.
Regarding page 23 paragraph 2, again the states experts did not verify their source in
a principle transaction. The sale was verified by the Rich County Assessor and the
assessors-buyer survey- sales transaction- submitted by the buyer. Pia's verification was
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after" the fact" and a face saving effort. Pia's verification was bias in that he needed to save
face to insure future business from their client.
Regarding page 24, paragraph 4, indicates Respondent's counsel has not read the
Transcript of the proceedings. It was evident in the transcript that none of the Respondent's
present at the hearing on July 7, 1995 had talked to any of the principles of these
transactions. Respondent's counsel has not cited one example of any of the Respondent's
conversations with a buyer or seller of any of their comparable sales. Because there are
none. Not before the hearing of July 7, 1995. Petitioners are at a loss to know how
Petitioner's could cross-examine the witnesses about a verification they had not conducted
before the hearing (Tr 105-108). Respondent's counsel did not site one instant where
Respondent's appraisers testified to talking, verifying any of their sales with a principle of the
transaction at the hearing of July 7,1995. Because there are none. Not one single sale was
verified with a principle by Respondent's appraisers before the hearing of July 7, 1995.
Because Respondent's appraiser did not verify their sales before trial, they used non arms
length transactions, included personal property in the sales prices, did not make necessary
adjustments for market conditions at the time of sale, and over stated their land adjustments.
All violations of USPAP. Because Respondent's did not verify their sales the Tax Commission
gave Respondent's at the post hearing submission, another 10 days. The commissioner
relied on the Respondent's Post Hearing Memorandum without giving Petitioner's the
opportunity to cross examine the "new" suspect information submitted by Respondents. The
Tax Commission did not even follow its own order. It allowed new information by the
respondents.
Page 25, paragraph 1, indicates Respondent's did not read the tax commission's
record. Petitioner's do not have a copy of the court record so has included page 5 Exhibit IA
(Respondent 10 day verification period in its entirety) Page 5 states in pertinent part:
"This property sold "as is" and the personal was valued at $6,000 in the May
1992 sale. This property was reportedly, in escrow and due to close soon. The
personal property in the current sales price includes 2 boats, 2 wave runners,
16

furniture, fixtures etc. valued by the buyer and seller at 11 % of the sales price".
The sale was verified at the time of sale, 1992 and again with the listing agent on or about
July 8,1994. At the verification of July 8,1994, Petitioners was informed by Paul Webb, the
property was about to close escrow again. Including the same personal property as in 1992
i.e. 2 boats, 2 wave runners, furniture, fixtures, linens, etc. The value placed on the personal
property by the buyer and seller was 11% of the sales price. Valued by buyer and seller
means the escrow instructions separated the value of the real and personal property by
allowing 11% to personal property and 89% to the real property.
It appears that the fact that Respondent's counsel could not find page 5 of the record
in an attempt to mislead the court. The fact that the property sold twice including basically the
same personal property supports the fact that most lake front properties sell with significant
personal property which includes, linens, T.V., eating utensils, furniture, boats, wave runners,
tractors, trailer, etc. because 90% of the properties are owned by second homes owned by
retired couples. The sellers, retired couples, have not place to house the furniture, linens,
boats, wave runners, tractors, trailer, etc. as their children have grown and moved out of the
area. It does not take a rocket scientist to understand how and why most lake front properties
(Not all Rich County Properties) but most lake front properties sell with significant personal
property. Meaning significant personal property over and above a typical sale. When
personal property is included in the sale price the value of the real property is overstated.
Regarding page 26, paragraph 2, again Respondent's counsel must not have reviewed
the Tax Commission record. Page 5 of the response to 10 day verification period, IA states
in pertinent part
"Otto Mattason referred me to Merl Spence at 4 Seasons Realty (phone #801946-8600). Merl verified that this comparable sold "as is" with all of the furniture
fixtures and household items, including a garage full of tools. She was unsure
of the value of the personal items. It was probably 10% of the sales price which
seems to be a common thread so far."
It is not Mr. Spence it is Mrs. Spence and Petitioners do not have a copy of Respondents 50
and therefore cannot address whatever issue Respondents are presenting.
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Page 27 is also meritless. The Petitioners record is concrete not Respondents.
Petitioners obeyed the law and complied with USPAP, Respondents did not. In lite of the
correct record Exhibit IA, there is no ambiguous or unsupported references. It appears that
Respondents created their own ambiguous and unsupported references by not reviewing the
tax commission record.
The question at the bottom of page 27 is the most astonishing of all. First of all, why
is the expert witness question the spokes person? They should have been excluded from the
hearing except for their testimony and cross-examination. Secondally, Bischoff/Pia's question
indicates how unfamiliar they are with Bear Lake Front Properties. The portion of the
question, "unless there was a tractor or boat or something" is the most telling of all. Most of
the sales of Bear Lake Lake Front Properties sell with tractors, riding lawn mowers, furniture,
fixtures, equipment, boats, trailers, etc.
Regarding page 28, paragraph 2, the fact that Farrel's appraisal of the Perkins Property
was not discussed, is attributable to the one fact and only one fact, that Perkins was not
afforded the opportunity of presenting his case (Tr 40 ). The tax commission had plenty of
time for Respondents to present their case and cross examine the Petitioners. Perkins had
no time-none to present his case. If the tax commission was interest in justice the post
submission period would have been for Perkins to submit his case. Perkins could have
discussed issues like:
1).

Court made the assumption that Mr. Zulauf was making full presentation for both

parties, when in fact only information relating to both properties was presented by him,
leaving pertinent information regarding Petitioner Perkins property unsubmitted.
2).

The sales used at the hearing of July 7,1995 were not the same as the ones

used at the County Appeals Board.
3).

No reply has been made regarding the fact that lots range in evaluation from

approximately $100 FF to $700 FF.
4).

No consideration made for the lack of fire hydrants, sewer, distance from marina

and other amenities.
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5).

Perkins tot is in the middle of seven lots that are higher on the east shore, $700

ff with no justification, the better more desirable ones are south west ranging from $100
FF to $450 FF.
6).

Page 8 item 14, of Respondents Brief, petitioners indicated at the may 9,1995

hearing property sales data did not show personal property and 931 Cisco Road sales
was not an arms length transaction. The property was sold to a brother to satisfy an
unpaid loan. This sale consisted of approximately 139 FF rather than 69 FF.
7).

Page 19 of Respondents Brief, comparable 4 should not be considered in the

present form. It does not take into account culinary water, sewer, closeness to marina
and other amenities not available in the Siddoway Subdivision.
8).

Petitioner Perkins has consistently indicated his property as being in a flood

zone or spring run off area having part of the driveway and beach washed out from
time to time.
9).

Steve Ferrels appraisal makes no consideration for the considerable extra depth

in the comparables lots. The adjustments for size difference, quality and gross living
area are much too low on comparable no. 3 which also has two refrigeration cooling
units not included. Comparable 4 is newer and larger, has better design and appeal,
should sell for at least $30,000 more.
Perkins should have had the opportunity to present these issues and more. But the
Commission was to busy attacking the petitioners spokes person and letting the Respondents
discuss non issues.
Regarding pages 29 paragraph 1 thru page 36, paragraph 2, is a clear illustration of
why: Petitioners should have had the right to cross examine the Respondent's expert witness.
By not verifying their sales, not being familiar with the area, not relying on brokers opinions,
the Respondent's opinion of value is extremely suspect. The expert witness did not want to
rely on the opinions of brokers and principles of the transactions but relied on selected
uncertified data from their client. Where is the "independence'' of their valuations. Obviously,
as pointed out in the opening brief and the experts own testimony, their interviews were not
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as in depth and detailed the Petitioners. We do not know what questions the Respondent's
expert witness asked-if you ask the wrong questions you will get the wrong answer. Did
Respondent's appraiser ask about Rich County property values in general, or lake front
property values-north/south/east/west side of the Lake. How many properties sold in 1994,
1993, etc. What was the average sales price? Do the Prices include (excluded) personal
property? All of these questions could have been answered and more, if the Respondent's
appraiser were familiar with local market trends and verified the sales while developing their
appraisal and not 1 year after it was submitted and after the hearing. The Petitioners have
been deprived of due process by the tax commission actions. Each time the Petitioners
prevailed, Board of Equalization hearing./arbitration/post trial conference, hearing of 7/7/95,
the tax commission, raised the bar. It is not the fault of Petitioner's that Respondents hired
appraisers that were not familiar with local market treads (the only appraisal, 1 SFR -Lynches
Cabin) at Bear Lake in 1994 Tr 71. appraisal, it is not the fault of the Petitioner's that
Respondents appraiser did not verify their sales property. It is not the fault of Petitioner's that
only 13% of the assessed lake front property values are within industry standards.
Regarding page 40, paragraph 1 thru page 41 paragraph 2, Petitioner did what
Hercules failed to do. Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 877 P.2d (Utah App 1994).
Petitioners demonstrated the county's original assessment contained errors. Numerous
errors. Petitioners provided the Rich County Assessor and the Tax Commissioner with a list
of 41 properties around the lake, 80% of which had some type of error. Tr 17. As indicated
earlier, the Rich County Assessor has, 1996, significantly lowered the Petitioners assessed
values. The Petitioners assessed values have been lowered while prices and other assessed
values have increased. Why? Because the Respondent is now (since 1994) beginning to
understand and apply USPAP. Respondent's counsel should talk to their client. Their client
has already reduced the values of the Petitioners significantly in 1996. Rich County has
indicated they would honor this courts decision for 1994 and apply it to the 1995 valuation.
Regarding page 41 paragraph 3, thru page 42 appears that Respondent's counsel is
working for Petitioner's. Regarding Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 877 P.2d (Utah
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App 1994), the citation by Respondent's counsel concerns estimating functional and economic
obsolescence. Neither of these appraisal concepts are at issue here. (As a side bar to the
case, a freebie for Respondent's counsel. Estimating total depreciation physical, functional
and economical, obsolescence is fairly easy for a knowledgeable appraiser. For example a
property costing $100,000 to build but it sells for $70,000. Total depreciation (physical,
functional, external) is obvious, $30,000. Depreciation is defined by appraisers as loss in
value due to any cause. The allocation between physical, functional and external is difficult
to measure, total depreciation can be measured very simply and accurately. The allocation
between physical, functional, and external/economic is rarely significant. But neither is this
case. Especially if you are not familiar with USPAP and generally accepted appraisal
practices.
Regarding Beaver County v Utah State Tax Com'n, 916 P2d 344 (Utah 1996) deals
with "valuation for property tax purposes is arf is an indication that Respondent's counsel has
very little knowledge of USPAP or generally accepted valuation principle and practices. The
ultimate purposed/goal/function of USPAP is to produced more credible results in appraising.
Regarding individual appraisal reports, this is being accomplished by standardizing
procedures. As our spokesperson, Zulauf, pointed out Tr 17 -22. USPAP is eliminating much
of the subjectivity of appraisals and replacing it with objectivity, verified market information.
Along with standardizing definitions and procedures that lead to more creditable results, 1993
USPAP is requiring appraisers to consider the effect of personal property in the sales price
SR1-2(e);
identify and consider the effect on value of any personal property, trade fixtures or
intangible items that are not real property but are included in the appraisal.
SR1-1(b);
not commit a substantial error or omission or commission that significantly affects an
appraisal.
SR1-1(c);
not render appraisal services in a careless or negligent manner, such as a series of
errors that, considered individually, may not significantly affect the results of an appraisal,
but which, when considered in the aggregate, would be misleading.
SR2-2(e);
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set forth the effective date of the appraisal and the date of the report.
Respondent did dot address the issue in the petitions brief; that both appraisals are barred
from the 1994 assessment (January 1,1994) due to their effective dates July 14,1994 and
April 20,1995 for the Bishoff/Pia and Farell appraisals respectifully.
SR2-2(a)(vi) 1994 statue, 1995 edition of USPAP;
state the extent and process of collecting, confirming, and reporting data.
SR2-2(a)(vii) 1994 statue, 1995 edition of USPAP;
state all assumptions and limiting conditions that affect the analyses, opinions, and
conclusions.

The rules center around the collection and verification of good market date. With good well
verified market date much of the subjective nature of appraising give way to more objective
values based on market data. Values become based not on "my subjective opinion of value
is "but my opinion of market value based upon the market data is".
Regarding mass appraisals USPAP SR6-1(a,b,c) states in pertinent part:
In developing a mass appraisal, an appraiser must:
a) be aware of, understand, and correctly employ those generally accepted methods and
techniques necessary to produce a credible appraisal;
Comment: Departure from this binding requirement is not permitted.
b) Not commit a substantial error of omission or commission that significantly affects a mass
appraisal;
Comment: Departurefromthis binding requirement is not permitted. Standards Rule 6-1
(b) is identical in purpose to Standards Rule 1-1 (b)
c) not render a mass appraisal in a careless or negligent manner;
Comment: Departurefromthis binding requirement is not permitted. Standards Rule 6-1
(c) is identical in purpose to Standards Rule 1-1 (c)

In developing credible appraisals 13% accuracy is not a credible result.
Sales with significant personal property, using improved land sales and not deducting the
value of the improvements to establish land value, not making adjustments for market
conditions at the time of sale, not making adjustments for terms of sales all significantly effect
land value. These are but a few of the reasons the assessors 1994 assessment roll is fatally
defective.
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SR6-2(g)(ii) 1994 statue, 1995 edition of USPAP;
consider whether an appraisal fractional interest or partial holding contributes pro rata
to the value of the whole.
Means consider non-arms length transactions.
SR6-2(h)1994 statute, 1995 edition of USPAP;
in appraising real property, consider the effect on use and value of the following factors:
existing land-use regulations, reasonably probable modifications of such regulations,
economic supply and demand, the physical adaptability of the property, neighborhood
trends, and the highest and best use of the property.
This includes being familiar with market conditions and current land values. Preforming
one appraisal a year on complex lake front single family properties does not constitute being
familiar with neighborhood trends.
SR6-3(c) states in pertinent part:
In developing a mass appraisal, an appraiser must:
(a) Identify and consider the appropriate procedures and market information required to perform
the appraisal, including all physical, functional, and external market factors as they may affect
the appraisal;
(b) employ generally accepted techniques for specifying property valuation models; and
(c) employ generally accepted techniques for calibrating mass appraisal models.
SR6-6(b) states in pertinent part:
(b) employ generally accepted mass appraisal testing procedures and techniques to ensure that
standards of accuracy are maintained.
Again properly applying USPAP leads to creditable results.
Finally, the case in the appendix of Respondent's Brief, Beaver County vs. Utah State Tax
Commission is also an illustration of Respondents confusion as to what constitutes real
property and what constitutes personal property. Barron's Law Dictionary defines personal
property as "things movable, as distinguished from real property or things attached to the
realty."

The Beaver County Case concerns "stock* personal property.

It appears

Respondent's counsel is also confused and wants to confuse real property issues with
personal property issues. Respondent's counsel must be confusing SR1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
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which deal with real property with SR7 which deals exclusively with personal property.
A more substitute case is Lynch vs. Utah Tax Commission 1992, also an unpublished
case where by the Tax Commission reduced Lynch's Bear Lake Front Land Value from $800
front foot to $450 a front foot. The decision of the instant case has a precedence case fixing
Petitioner Lynch's land value at $450 front foot and a 1996 assessed value fixing Perkins land
value at $575, and Lynches property at $650 per front foot.. Allowing for two years increased
values the Respondents own value would be $460 for Perkins and $520 for Lynch in the 1994
tax year.
CONCLUSION
The differences between the petitioner values and the respondents values is the
difference between complying with USPAP and not complying with USPAP. Petitioners values
are based on collected, well verified data that does not include personal property in the sales
prices, does not overstate the value of land adjustments, and includes adjustments for market
conditions at the time of sale. The Respondent's appraisal based on the subjectional "trust
me I am an appraiser approach". As indicated previously, even Respondents now, 1996
assessment, agree with Petitioners. The Rich County assessor has significantly lowered both
of the petitioners assessed values in the 1996 assessments. It is a shame that Respondent's
counsel has wasted the petitioners time, the respondent's time, and the court's time.
Additionally, Respondent's counsel did not contradict, refute, or present one single authority
that is compelling in favor of the Respondent. Because there are none.
Therefore Petitioners pray for reversal of the Tax Commission's decision of July 7,
1995 and cost of appeal and or any other relief this Court deems appropriate.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of November 1996.
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APPENDIX 1
1A- Response to 10 day verification period

ALPHA SECURITY TRUST
EUGENE B. LYNCH
1105 Patterson
Ogden, Utah 84403
(801)393-4791

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
) RESPONSE TO 10 DAY
) VERIFICATION PERIOD
) GRANTED AT HEARING
) JULY 7, 1995.

ALPHA SECURITY TRUST,
Petitioner,
Vs.

)

) Appeal No: 94-2231
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF
RICH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

)

) Serial No: 41-33-28-077
)

Respondent.

) Tax Type: Property Tax

i
This was the first time, in the past 12 years, I had the assessor's sales before
the trial began. Thank you for the step in the right direction. However, I only received
the States' response to my interrogatories 2 days before the trial on July 7,1995. The
system still needs more work. Especially, when they are dealing with senior citizens. I
was sick and unable to do much preparation the day before the trial and unable to
verify the information contained in the interrogatories received two days before trial.
Additionally, I felt we were rushed and did not have an opportunity to present ail of the
facts of my case. I feel Harold Perkins had even less time. Especially, in light that our
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case centered around the data presented in the States Appraisal. I found it interesting
that the only defense offered by the State was that my spokes person, Marvin Zulauf,
was not licensed to appraise properties in the State of Utah, that Harold Perkins and I
had used some sacred form, and the Utah Tax Commission should not use the analysis
provided by myself or Harold, because Harold and I are not Appraisers licensed by the
State ofutah.
In order to put the Utah Tax Commissions mind to rest, we (Marvin Zulauf,
Harold Perkins and myself) went to visit the Director of Real Estate Appraisers for the
State of Utah on July 10,1995, the Monday after the trial. We spoke with Mr David S.
Jones, an investigator for the Department of Real Estate Appraisers. Mr. Jones was
surprised to hear that Harold Perkins and myself were not allowed to uses the forms we
used to present our data. Especially, when we were only following the instructions
furnished in the Assessor's appeal form. When we told the investigator that Mr. Craig
Jolly implied, at the hearing, that Harold Perkins and I were not allow to present our
version of a market analysis/appraisal to the Tax Commission on the forms we used,
Mr. Jones said," any person supporting that position (Mr. Jolly) is not familiar with the
law." When asked, "if Mr. Zulauf could represent himself and help his father-in-law with
a property Mr. Zulauf has a beneficial interest in?" Mr. Jones said, "the state had no
problem with Mr. Zulauf representing himself or Mr. Lynch." When asked, "if Mr. Zulauf
could help Harold Perkins fill out the market data grids, submitted by Mr. Perkins,
without compensation?" Mr. Jones did not have a problem with that action. So it
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appears that we have not violate any law.
The Pia/ Bischoff/Jolly appraisal has several violations of the law, USPAP. This
was verified indirectly by Mr. Jones. By indirectly, I mean we went over Steve Fen-ell's
appraisal of Mr. Perkins property. The appraisals contain essentially the same
comparables because Steve Ferrell borrowed his comparables and analysis from the
Pia/Bischoff/Jolly appraisal, both have the same violations. Mr. Jones has previously
worked with Steve Ferrell and withdrew himself from the investigation. He referred us
to Shelley Wismer, Legal Counsel, State of Utah, Department of Commerce, Division of
Real Estate. My concerns with the Pia/Bischoff/Jolly appraisal is as follows:
1.

None of the sales presented by the state were adequately verified with a

principle of the transaction. (A violation of USPAP Preamble paragraph 1, Ethics
Provision-Conduct & Management,; SR1-1 (b), (c), ;SR 1-4 (b): If the sales were
adequately verified we would not have;
2.

All of the sales presented by the State contained personal property. The

value of the personal property ranged from 5 to over 20% of the reported sales prices
and included boats, wave runners, tractors, trailers, household items like eating
utensils, linens, TV sets, furniture etc. I verified the sales in the Pia/Bischoff/Jolly
report with Otto Mattson (Phone # 801-946-3305), Owner of Western Realty Garden
City, and a representative of either the buyer or seller in most of the comparables used
in the Pia/Bischoff/Jolly appraisal. The pertinent information verified with Otto Mattson
is as follows:
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Regarding Sale #1,1 think we adequately discussed this sale at the hearing.
This sale was verified with Bill Peterson, Appraiser and owner of Bear Lake
Realty in Garden City. This was an non-arms length transaction that contained
approximately 10% personal property. This sale was also verified with the seller and
buyer by Harold Perkins. It is interesting to note that at the hearing Pia/Bischoff/Jolly
never said they verified the sale-they only wanted to know who we verified the sale
with-if they verified the sale why didn't the simply say so-for that matter why didn't the
Commissioner ask who they verified the sale with?

Regarding sale #2 of the Bischoff/Pia/Jolly report- Lakota Subdivision
This property sold "as is" with all personal property- furniture including beds,
living room furniture, linens, eating utensils, etc. According to Ottp4he_pe>sona|
property was in fairio poor condition and represented only 5% of the sales price.

Regarding sale #3
This property sold "as is" with all personal property- valued at approximately
10% of the reported sales price.

Regarding Sale # 4
This property sold "as is" and included personal property probably 15% of
reported sales price.
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Regarding Sale #5
This property sold "as is" and the personal was valued at $6,000 in the May
1992 sale. This property was reportedly, in escrow and due to close soon. The
personal property in the current sales price includes 2 boats, 2 wave runners, furniture
fixtures etc. valued by the buyer and seller at 11% of the sales price.

Regarding Sale #6
Otto Mattson referred me to Merl Spence at 4 Seasons realty (Phone # 801-9468600). Merl verified that this comparable sold "as is" with aji*«0^ufniture fixtures
and household items, including a garage-futt of tools. She was unsure of the value of
the personal items. It was probably 10% of the sales price which seems to be a
common thread so far.

Regarding the 3 additional sales provided by Craig Jolly; we verified the
following:
Additional Land Comp 1-APN:41 -33-28-081. This sale did not have any personal
property but did have improvements to the land. Apparently, the State does not
recognize the difference between vacant improved land and vacant unimproved land.
This parcel reportedly sold for $35,000. The terms of sale were not disclosed by the
State. I interviewed the seller and found out the sale included a seawall along the
north property line, chain link fencing, and sewer connection. Additionally, Drew
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Jensen has drug sand from the lake to bujld this lot up, so it is not below the high water
mark, which is superior to my property. The comparable IpjJ^rrJbfaSJAHcte as my lot
and even the assessor has recognized; ^ttre past that 50 foot lots sell for more than
100 foot lots on a front foot basis. Additionally, this lot, although close to my lot, has a
superior location because instead of sand at the high water mark the iot line abuts to
the water. (See the original photograph of Drew Jensen's lot submitted by myself at the
Board of Equalization Hearing on May 3,1995. If being close to the water creates
value it doesn't get much better than that photograph. When Mr. Jolly presents only
data to the court without all of the facts, he is trying to mislead the court. After
adjusting this sale for the site improvements and other factors that affect value the
adjusted price is as follows:

Sales Price

$35,000

Date of Sale -11.25% or $3,938 (Based on survey presented by
my spokes person Marvin Zulauf, I think it was Exhibit 2.)
Less estimated value, of site improvements, sea wall, sewer,
fencing, sand, drug up to increase the elevation of the site.
$6,000,
Less site frontage adjustment (Estimated at $25.00 per Front foot
or$25x50FF=)$1,250.
Adjusted Sales price equals:
Reported Sales Price

$35,000
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Less Adjustments:
Date of Sale

$3,938

Site Improvements

6,000

Frontage Adj.

1,250

(11.188)

Adjusted sales price

$23,812

Adjusted price per front foot $23,812/50 FF =

$476.00 Rounded

Of course this adjustment ignores the comparable has a superior location with water at
the seawall when the lake is up the high water mark. After adjusting, for the
comparables superior location, this sale which the State thinks supports $700 FF really
supports My estimate of $400 to $450 FF.

Regarding Additional Comp. 2 Improved Apn 41-34-00-007
This sale would require a negative adjustment for time since it occurred in April
Of 1995 and the date of value is January 1,1994. Additionally, according to Otto
i •

Mattson, this comparable contained $30,000 in personal property. The sales price for
the real estate was $180,000 and the sales price reported by Craig Jolly at $210,000
i

included personal property. This error overstates this comparable sales price by
$30,000/$210,000 or 14%. [Is the Tax Commission starting to see a few common treads
here. The State is not verifying their sales and not following USPAP. No wonder the
County cannot get it right].
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Regarding additional comp #3- Improved
<

I verified the sales price with the 0uyer-Kalbach. The sales price was $187,500
and included personal property valued ft between $30,000 and $40,000. The property
sold "as is" and included furniture, appliances, linens, eating utensils, a tractor and
utility trailer. Additionally, the buyer is not the typical purchaser around the Lake.
Kalbach uses his property to demonstrate boats and equipment for his clients. Kalbach
owns a sports equipment business in Logan and entertains clients at this comparable.
Kaibaeh-purchased the lake front property to enhance his sports business-he is not a
typical purchaser.
In addition to the errors above which favor the Assessor/State by over stating the
value of my property by (20 to 30%) the State appraised my property on the wrong
date. As pointed out by my spokes person, Marvin Zulauf, if prices have increased
since the assessment date (January 1,1994) then this also over states the value of my
property. If our survey is correct, Exhibit 2 presented at the hearing, lake front property
ya|ues had increased by 10 to 20 % per year. The appraisal date was July 1994-seven
months after the correct date of value. This represents a 8 to 10% error and again over
§tates the value of my property. What I do not understand is why do all of the errors
favor the State/Assessor and over value my property. It would seem if these errors
were just a mistake, then there would be some errors that favored the poor over taxed
tax payer.
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These errors 20 to 30% explain impart why the assessors values, Exhibit I, are
'$•

off by 50%. The assessed values are pot low as indicated by the court but the sales
prices are high. High because of the lack of time adjustments, high because sale
prices included personal property and jjigh because in some instances the sales are
not arms-length transactions.

Dated: July 17,1995.
Respectfully Submitted

Gene Lynch
Alpha Security Trust.
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